Search Results for: Pure breed cattle
requires that for all t≠s e(s,s) ≥ e(t,s), and e(s,t) > e(t,t) in this formulation, the first condition specifies that the strategy is a nash equilibrium, and the second specifies that maynard smith's second condition is met. note that the two definitions are not precisely equivalent: for example, each pure
invade a population of c strategists by scoring equally well against c, but they pay a price when they begin to play against each other; c scores better against d than does d. so here although e(c, c) = e(d, c), it is also the case that e(c,d) > e(d,d). as a result, c is an ess. even if a game has pure...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionarily_stable_strategy